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A Conversation with Philippe Descola
EDUARDO KOHN 
McGill University
The distinguished anthropologist Philippe Descola has worked among the 
Jivaroan Achuar in Ecuador’s Amazon region, since the mid-1970s. Author 
of numerous influential books and publications, he holds a professorship at the 
Collège de France and is also Directeur d’études and Directeur du Laboratoire 
d’Anthropologie Sociale at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in 
Paris.
EK: I don’t know if I ever told you this, but as a graduate student I was 
fortunate to have visited the Achuar; I did a couple of short stints as a 
‘naturalist guide’—that was my title—at the Kapawi Ecolodge and Reserve.
PD: Yes, I was in Kapawi myself, but that was long before it was a lodge. 
It’s in the midst of Achuar territory. And indeed, some of the Achuar now 
working there are people that I knew quite well.
EK: It was quite amazing to enter an Achuar house and find a man 
greeting you with a loaded shotgun across his lap, to visit houses that are 
fortified because of ongoing feuds, and to stumble across, in the middle 
of the forest, a shelter that had recently been used for an arutam vision 
quest—all of these things that I had read about in your work. On our way 
out I met a man, Domingo Peas, a leader in local and national indigenous 
politics—someone very well read and articulate, and also very much part 
of the Achuar world. Anyways, he said that he had read your books and 
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that you were the only outsider to have really gotten things right. He was 
like, “you know, he really got it.” And that, I think, is quite a compliment.  
PD: I’m very happy to know that. Anne-Christine1 and I really enjoyed 
living among the Achuar although we haven’t been back for almost ten 
years now. But I would very much like to go back now, if only for personal 
reasons, to know what’s going on, to visit friends. I’m working on very 
different things now. I’m not sure I’m really an Americanist anymore.   
EK: You’re certainly moving beyond a vision of Anthropology as limited to 
one geographical area. And yet I see your life work—and you say as much 
yourself—as hinging on a fundamental ethnographic insight that came 
from living intimately with the Achuar.
PD: Absolutely. I think that anthropologists are always doing something 
more than ethnography; we try to understand the general properties of 
social life. But we also bring to that task a sort of astonishment in our 
experience of the world. And this freshness is something we get from 
doing fieldwork. People say that philosophy aims to expand on your 
astonishment—on your innocence towards the world. But I think that this 
can be said about anthropology as well, and perhaps even more so. Most 
of the general anthropological questions I asked myself after the field 
were derived from this initial experience. But there’s another dimension 
as well. Initially, at least, the notion of society that you work with is very 
much linked, not so much to the society you study, but to the contrast 
between your own society and the society you study. This exerts a sort of 
tension—a dynamic—which helps you carry on with a certain concept 
of what a group of people is. But to get back to the first point about my 
formative experiences among the Achuar, as you know, I went to the field 
with a very general idea of studying the relationship between a society and 
its environment. And I made the usual inquiries that people make when 
they want to study these kinds of things. But what really made me marvel 
was the realization that, although the Achuar certainly recognized certain 
discontinuities between humans and non-humans, these discontinuities 
were radically different from our own. And this was a bit surprising in an 
expected way, but also in an unexpected one. I was expecting this because 
I’d read, of course, not only the South American ethnography, but also 
Tylor, Frazer, Durkheim and a few others pioneers of our discipline whose 
work was entirely devoted to resolve this bizarre scandal, that some people 
appear not to make distinctions between humans and non-humans. So, I 
was prepared to find that. I was prepared to find it at the level of, as we 
would say at the time, ‘representations’ at the level of ways of thinking 
about life. But I had no way of understanding how people would actually 
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live with this idea and put it into practice, or really experience the world 
in this fashion. And this is the discovery. No? It’s not only what people 
say; their whole way of life revolved around the fact that they didn’t make 
a distinction between nature and society. And this was really the starting 
point for everything I’ve done since.
EK: Yes, the shock of actually being in a world where nature doesn’t exist.
PD: Exactly! Where it’s so present for you, but it doesn’t exist for the 
people with whom you live. You see? 
EK: In a nutshell this is the question that has guided you throughout your 
career: How do we deal with this construct of ours—nature—which is 
obviously a construct, like so many others, and yet it’s one that remains 
invisible to us as such because it’s so ‘natural.’ And so, I think it’s just 
wonderfully provocative that the title of your professorship at the Collège 
de France is “Chair of the Anthropology of Nature.”
PD: Yes, I chose this precisely because I think the oxymoron is extremely 
stimulating intellectually.
EK: Right, just like “human nature,” as you point out in your most recent 
book (Descola 2005).
PD: There’s no better way to begin to explore a series of questions than 
by an oxymoron. And so this is precisely why I specifically chose this title 
(laughing). What’s surprising, as my friend Bruno Latour says, is that my 
colleagues at the Collège de France, at the time I was elected, apparently 
didn’t, or were not aware of the, uh, how should I put it… I was about to 
say revolutionary, but at least the paradoxical attitude toward the social 
sciences that this implied.
EK: You’re referring to your colleagues in the social sciences, or your 
colleagues also in the natural sciences?
PD: Also in the natural sciences. I was fortunate enough that I was 
presented for membership to the Collège de France by a natural scientist, 
the neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux, as well as by a social scientist, 
the ethnohistorian Nathan Wachtel… Well, it’s a complex story. It would 
take hours to explain the workings of this very bizarre institution. But I’m 
quite interested in what my colleagues in the natural sciences are doing in 
the cognitive domain in general.
EK: I gathered that from your recent book. I mean, you’re trying to link 
what anthropologists call schemata with some of the latest findings in the 
neurosciences, and your argument also depends on the claim that there 
exists a pan-human cognitive propensity to perceive oneself and others 
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in terms of some combination of interiority and physicality—for many 
socio-cultural anthropologists, such a claim would be considered quite 
controversial.
PD: I think that it’s a mistake for anthropologists not to be aware of what’s 
going on in science. This is especially true of the cognitive sciences. There’s 
always the danger of saying or writing foolish things based on obsolete 
knowledge. Or, of tolerating people from these domains—and this is still 
very much the case with Evolutionary Psychology—to write very foolish 
things that contradict the basic facts and notions that Anthropology has 
established
EK: —and that contradict basic tenets of Evolutionary Biology as well, for 
that matter.
PD: Yes, exactly. Evolutionary Psychology, and Memetics too, by the way, 
are science fictions, because they discard the facts. So, yes, I think that one 
should not consider with condescendence these questions of cognition. 
And that one should be, well, knowledgeable about them.
EK: Yes, and furthermore, if we really are going to undertake a monistic 
Anthropology, as you suggest, then the old dualistic strategy of dividing 
and separating—the old strategy of saying, “well, we anthropologists deal 
with society, and the biologists, rightly or wrongly, are doing something 
else, about which we don’t have to worry,” has got to go. It’s just not tenable. 
I mean, if one is to do a truly monistic Anthropology, then it has to be in a 
certain kind of a dialogue with the sciences.
PD: Quite right.  
EK: I think this might be a good opportunity to discuss more explicitly 
Par-delà nature et culture (Beyond Nature and Culture),2 your most recent 
book. Anglophone anthropologists are well acquainted with your books, 
In the Society of Nature (1994) and The Spears of Twilight (1996). I must say 
that my own research was very much influenced by In the Society of Nature. 
And I have taught both of these books with great success in my classes. 
Par-delà nature et culture really expands on these. You’re taking western 
dualism straight on, and trying to show a way out of the dualistic trap that 
we’ve set for ourselves—and you do this, in great part, through the insights 
you bring to bear on this topic as an Amazonianist. But you really take it 
well beyond Amazonia as well.
PD: I was fortunate to have been able to discuss these ideas, over the 
years, with a small group of friends and very astute and sharp critics for 
the Amazonian material. Among these is Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. 
He and I just held a public debate, a sort of “disputatio,” as Bruno Latour 
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calls it,3 which is part of an ongoing discussion that we’ve had in Paris, 
in Cambridge, in Rio, that spans twenty years. And I was very fortunate 
because these discussions really helped to reorganize my arguments. And 
the other interlocutor who really helped me a lot was Bruno Latour  
EK: —of course—
PD: who’s a friend. As with Eduardo, I agree with him on certain things, 
but what’s important, of course, is on what we disagree on, because that’s 
what helps me move forward. Tim Ingold is a third important interlocutor. 
I also have had many discussions with him over the years. And I admire 
him, but at the same time I disagree with him on many points. So, I think 
I’m very fortunate to have these three anchoring points as my ‘sparring 
partners,’ so to speak. I think that intellectual endeavor and scientific 
research is very largely fuelled by controversies, whether public or private, 
of this kind.  
EK: Yes. Absolutely. There’s a certain kind of productive agonism, which 
is important.
PD: Absolutely. We have to share very basic principles, about how to 
proceed forward and we need to share a certain way of posing the problems. 
But then afterwards, there are differences and discrepancies. And these 
differences and discrepancies are what fuel our progress.  
EK: Right. I see many connections between your work and, especially, that 
of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Bruno Latour. And I see important 
foundations for their work in your own. Latour’s We Have Never Been 
Modern (1993) depends on a certain ethnographic claim that non-moderns 
do not neatly separate humans from non-humans
PD: —yes, yes, of course the Achuar! (laughing)—
EK: I mean it’s really foundational to his whole thesis. I would say the same 
about Eduardo.4 His multinaturalism is an extension of your animistic 
critique of western naturalism, even though, of course, there are important 
differences. So, I see you as having provided an important foundation for 
many of the central claims that both these scholars make.
PD: Well, the difference is that—well, there are many differences. But one 
of the differences, and Bruno Latour states it well in his presentation of 
the “disputatio,” is that I take animism as one ontology among others—
one that should not be privileged but one that should not be discarded 
either. Whereas Eduardo is involved in some sort of personal battle 
against naturalism, in that perspectivism for him is much more than the 
Amazonian version of perspectivism—by which I mean an account of 
the non-reciprocal perception of different kinds of beings. For Viveiros 
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de Castro perspectivism now goes beyond this and has become a sort of 
general philosophy of knowledge, which, as he says, he hopes to hurl as an 
explosive device against western epistemology itself. But what still very 
much interests me, and what still really animates me, is to try to make 
some sense of ethnography in general—to make sense of the bizarre 
ways that people do things and to try to understand the compatibilities 
and incompatibilities between certain traits and institutions. And so the 
general anthropological project is still very much for me in the forefront. 
Eduardo has deviated from this. It’s no longer his priority. His priority 
is political and epistemological, in the sense of trying to undermine the 
foundations of western rationality and epistemology. For me his is more a 
philosophical program than an anthropological one.
EK: Yes, I’ve also been thinking about this in terms of Eduardo Viveiros 
de Castro. I was first exposed to his work while doing doctoral fieldwork 
among the Quichua-speaking Runa, in Ecuador’s Upper Amazon. I 
came up to Quito to participate with him, and a whole group of very 
interesting Americanists, on a panel at the 1997 Americanists Meetings 
on the ‘self ’ organized by Anne-Christine Taylor. I immediately realized 
that he really got something, empirically, about how Amazonians see 
things. Through his work I began to understand the perspectival shifts 
that were ethnographically so evident to me among the Runa, as part of 
something broader. So, I appreciate multinaturalism as an ethnographic 
reality and especially as a critique of naturalism—a critique of what he calls 
“multiculturalism”. And yet… is it more than a convenient, ethnographically 
situated, critique of our ‘nature?’ 
PD: My point is very simple. I think that I have the same difference with 
Eduardo as I do with Tim Ingold. I don’t think that one kind of ontology 
should be privileged over another. That would amount to a sort of reverse 
ethnocentrism, no?  Multinaturalism is very interesting in the sense that it 
reverts the usual contrasts. But that doesn’t mean that it’s a more relevant 
contrast. I mean, it’s not a truer contrast than the other one. The world 
is continuous and we can’t get direct access to its essence, only to the 
phenomena. And no phenomenon is truer than another one.
EK: This gets at another question that I grapple with in my own work—the 
question of ontology—and one that I struggle with in trying to understand 
your own work as well. You juxtapose four fundamental ways of relating 
to others, especially to non-humans, and you call these “ontologies,” by 
which you mean the different “systems of properties that humans ascribe 
to beings” (Descola 2006:139). These ontologies vary as to the contrasting 
ways in which people ascribe the fundamental qualities of interiority 
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(intentionality or selfhood) and physicality (the ways in which bodies 
permit action) to beings in the world. Just to recap, the four modes you 
identify are: 1) animism, in which differently embodied kinds of humans and 
non-humans share a similar interiority, this is exemplified by Amazonian 
multinaturalism; 2) naturalism, where humans and nonhumans share a 
physicality but only humans have an interiority, a mode best exemplified 
by modern western science; 3) totemism, where certain groupings of 
humans and non-humans are united because they share interior as well 
as physical attributes, a mode found in Aboriginal Australia; and, 4) 
analogism, in which humans and non-humans are understood to be made 
up of fragmented essences, essences whose relationships can be mapped 
onto similarly linked essences possessed by other entities, this is a mode 
exemplified, as you note, by the ancient Inca State.  
EK: So, although we usually begin our analysis with things like social 
organization or culture, and then try to see how these might structure 
experience, you’re saying, “there’s something deeper.” Of the four modes 
that can inform experience, animism and naturalism are the ones we’re 
most familiar with
PD: —for the Amazonianist, at least, yes.
EK: Yes, for the Amazonianist. I very much appreciate the critique of 
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cultural relativism that your approach implies. The relativist assumes a 
natural ontology and something on top of this—culture, or ‘representation.’ 
And so she compares the differences among cultures. But you’re saying, 
“We first need to ask whether or not nature itself exists.” Culture is no 
longer the variable, because nature is no longer stable. I appreciate that 
you’re going back to something deeper.
PD: It’s a very simple view, in fact. It’s Humean in a sense, no? I mean 
the world is composed of qualities. I’m not interested in the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities. What’s interesting to me is that 
according to these very basic premises that I’ve sketched in the book, you’ll 
be able, most of the time, to elicit some of the qualities, or render explicit 
some of the contrasts. But some of these are blocked off—inhibited—
because of the social context within which we’ve been raised. Which 
means that there’s only one form of inference that would be stabilized 
in a given context; only one form that would give the scheme for which 
reality is perceived and acted upon. So, this doesn’t mean that people live 
in different worlds. It means that there are certain ways of living in the 
world that are partly blocked off. The qualities emerge via the interaction 
between the subjects that perceive and act upon the world, and the specific 
physical properties of the world itself. This isn’t a representation or a 
construction. It’s an actualization of properties against certain lines that 
are favored, or blocked, or inhibited according to the basic assumptions 
you make about the qualities of things, especially in regard to what I call 
interiority and physicality. The different ways in which interiority and 
physicality are juxtaposed and weighted give each of these four ontologies 
their distinctive properties. Along these lines, you know, the philosopher 
Michel Serres, has just written a book, which is an exploration of the four 
ontologies I’ve isolated.
EK: Oh really? That’s exciting! What’s it called?
PD: It has a very long title. It’s called Écrivains, savants et philosophes font 
le tour du monde (2009). And apparently, somebody told me, he devoted 
several seminars at Stanford on it. He chooses within the western world 
certain philosophers, writers, and artists and tries to see how each of them 
is rather more a totemist or more an analogist, etc., which is an interesting 
endeavor. And it’s quite natural because art, or certain kinds of reflexive 
thought, or philosophy, enjoy a certain degree of freedom, which affords 
the possibility of stepping into different ontologies, divorced from the one 
in which you were born. And so, in that sense it’s obvious, for example, that 
Leibniz is an analogist in many respects, etc., etc.
EK: Right, these ontological modes are not just contextually bounded. 
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They can travel. It’s sort of shamanistic. I mean, Amazonians can come to 
inhabit different kinds of bodies, each implying a different way of being in 
the world. Right?
PD: Yes.
EK: Maybe this is a kind of intellectual shamanism, a form of travel among 
modes of being that’s possible precisely because these ontologies aren’t 
reducible to an all-encompassing social sphere. 
PD: Exactly, and not reducible to culture, to worldview, or to things like 
that—precisely. That’s my main point. And yet… I mean, when you write 
a book, you find (laughing) that anything you write can be appropriated 
and taken away from you and can acquire a life of it’s own. And so it’s very 
difficult to struggle against the misapprehension of what you’ve written. 
But still, one of the misunderstandings of my work that I’m trying to fight, 
is the idea that what I’ve done in this book is to provide Anthropology 
with a way to classify societies, which is absolutely not my intention. I 
view my project more as a kind of experimental machine, which allows me 
to capture certain kinds of phenomena and to organize them, within, of 
course, a framework that helps us understand how these phenomena can 
be accounted for.  And this helps me to understand certain basic principles 
that will allow the combination of certain things, but not the combination 
of others. I find it very interesting, not to classify but to try to discover the 
basic differences among things, which appear on a continuum. You know, 
I’ve been working for the last few years on images. And I’m preparing a 
book on that right now.
EK: Really?
PD: And I’ve found that these four ontologies really help to understand 
figuration and imagery. They help explain why certain kinds of images are 
being made in some places and not in others, for instance.
EK: That’s fascinating. So, these modes can really travel analytically as well, 
beyond Anthropology.   
PD: Precisely.
EK: I want to go back to the question of ontology for a moment. I’m still 
struggling in my own work with what we mean by ontology. Like yours, 
the book I’m writing is also an attempt to come to grips with the problem 
of dualism and the question of how best to understand nature. Through 
my study of the ways in which the Runa relate to the many kinds of 
beings that inhabit the forest, I’m looking for some way out of the implicit 
dualism that pervades virtually all our modes of analysis. This question 
of ontology, maybe I can ask it this way. You’re not making a historical 
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claim about these four modes. If these were cultural modes, you might 
make a diffusionist argument to account for their distribution across the 
globe. Right? You know… “Sub-arctic peoples are historically related to 
Amazonians and therefore they share a way of being.” That would be a 
cultural explanation. You’re obviously not doing that. And yet, how do you 
account for the fact that these modes of beings map onto the world in a 
particular way? Why are there four modes of being and not more? Why are 
so many Amazonians animists?
PD: (laughing) Well, I think that… I called them somewhere archipelagos 
precisely to emphasize the fact that these ontologies are spatially 
discontinuous. I think they reflect—I was about to say, basic choices. 
They’re not quite that, of course, or they’re choices in the sense that we 
talk of technological choices—in the sense that they’re the actualization 
and adoption of premises that are not really thought about. But are 
there material conditions that favor the actualization of one system over 
another? I should think the reverse. It is because of the actualization of 
these ontologies that certain paths, certain options, are taken. This is why 
you end up with certain specific social formations and even technological 
choices. It’s not society or technology that determines ontology, but the 
other way around.
EK: I see.  
PD: Of course, you don’t always find these in their pure states. Some 
ontologies have changed, and evolved towards different systems. As we 
know from the Americas, especially South America, there are vast areas 
where the ontologies are in a state of hybridity. There’s a clear contrast 
between the analogist world of the highlands and the animic world of the 
lowlands. But there’s also an arc spreading northwest, along the foothills 
of the Andes, extending through Colombia, among what was called in the 
Handbook of South American Indians the “circum- Caribbean tribes,” no?
EK: Yes.
PD: Where there’s a mixture; certain aspects are obviously animic and 
other aspects are obviously analogic. You find that really clearly in the 
northwest Amazon among people like the Witoto, and the Bora. These 
are, I think, very interesting examples because they show us to what degree 
things can combine before the mode switches to something else. I think 
that you would find exactly the same type of thing in Southeast Asia. The 
highland population in Vietnam, for instance, would differ a lot from the 
main ethnic Vietnamese population. And this is something you find also 
in Malaysia as well. And, of course, the peaceful cohabitation among these 
peoples meant that there are certain traits that have migrated. And if they 
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are accepted, it means that they’re compatible with the structure of the 
existing ontology and everything that goes with it.
EK: Right. Let me just return back to the Amazonian mode for a moment. 
I very much appreciate all of the work you’ve done to rethink animism. 
But, here’s a question:  Just as we take seriously the Achuar claim that 
there is no nature, what if we seriously entertain the equally widespread 
Amazonian notion that animals have souls. In other words, regardless 
whether or not different people ascribe this property to them, do animals 
have souls?
PD: You see, when I lecture for a public audience, not necessarily an 
academic one, people aren’t surprised at all. They say, “What’s the big deal 
about animals having souls, my rose bush has a soul too.” And these are 
nice little old ladies (laughing). So it’s a perfectly accepted notion in a way, 
but it’s never taken to its utmost consequences here. The idea that there 
might be some sort of interiority or intentionality, let’s say, in the wider 
non-human realm, is a common assumption throughout the world.
EK: One that might also correspond to something about the way the world 
is: animacy exists beyond humans.
PD: But, some people take seriously the consequences that this implies, 
and others try to downplay them. And so in our ontology, people have 
downplayed the consequences. But that doesn’t prevent people from 
perceiving in certain non-humans, some qualities, some properties, that 
allow them to make inferences about non-human internal states, and 
that make possible some form of communication, or empathy, with them.
But only the animic societies have taken this seriously, in the sense that 
they’ve explored all the consequences of treating non-humans as animate 
in this way. They’ve admitted that it’s legitimate and they’ve explored and 
elaborated on the consequences of it. In other situations, this isn’t the 
case. Aboriginal Australians don’t think in these terms. But this doesn’t 
mean that they can’t relate to animals, only that they’ve downplayed this 
—inhibited it. It’s not a question of whether it’s right or wrong to say that 
animals have souls, it’s only that… there’s a universal inference that’s either 
favored or inhibited according to the ontological context.
EK: Right. Right, so I guess the question is: In a place like Amazonia 
under what circumstances would these sorts of inferences get validated 
and magnified?  
PD: Well, I think that what gives an empirical basis for sustaining and 
reinforcing this idea is hunting.
EK: Yes!
11
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PD: I say it’s not an explanation; Australians, also hunt. But the basic 
thing about hunting is that you put yourself in the position of the prey. 
Anyone who hunts anywhere in the world would say this. So, this ability 
to exchange positions, I think, is the basis for perspectivism. At least, this is 
a huge phenomenological basis for perspectivism. But I think the question 
is not why Amazonians have developed this, but why others have departed 
from it.
EK: So it’s not so much animic hunters that interest you but accounting 
for all those hunters that aren’t animists. 
PD: Exactly. There’s a phenomenological basis for animism, but that’s 
not enough. I think hunting just provides further proof; it renders things 
obvious, no? But it’s not enough.
EK: So, do animals have souls?  
PD: The problem of the soul, is a bit…
EK: ‘Soul’ is a very loaded word. The point is, if other kinds of beings are 
indeed animate—and this is what, I think, this question about the status 
of non-human souls captures—and we relate to them based on this fact, 
then the terms of our engagement with them will be set, not only by our 
different modalities of ascribing properties to them, but also by the fact 
that these other kinds of beings will see us in different ways, and in ways 
that matter—vitally—to us. And this—and here I agree with Eduardo, but 
only in his initial privileging of animism—radically changes the stakes and 
methods of Anthropology.  Animism forces us to come to grips with the 
fact that we humans are not the only ones who know the world. Therefore, 
our human-centered analytics—those that underpin all of the human 
sciences as well as the basis for its division from the natural ones—have 
to be rethought to show how the human is open to these other ways of 
knowing, and being, in the world. This, as I see it, is why animism, and 
non-human “souls,” are so important.    
PD: Soul is a loaded word. 
EK: Yes, of course.
PD: You know that Aristotle and a whole philosophical tradition in Europe 
up until the eighteenth century proposed different kinds of souls. Animals 
had some kind of soul, but they were different from the human kind. So, if 
we take soul in the Amazonian sense, that is, as a capacity to communicate 
with non-specifics and to see the world as a subject, I think that anyone 
can admit to that. If you take soul in that sense, yes, I should think so.
EK: I guess the reverse is more interesting: How does it come to be that 
12
Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol7/iss2/1
 A Conversation with Philippe Descola 147
someone might claim that an animal is a machine? That’s a more interesting 
question.
PD: It’s a more interesting question, yes, because it’s counterintuitive. 
Saying that an animal is a machine is counterintuitive. It’s part also of a 
general process of physical explanation, which implies discarding certain 
qualities of the animal in order to foster this point of view. So, in a sense 
naturalism is perhaps more bizarre and counterintuitive then one might 
think. People like Pascal Boyer insist on the counterintuitive nature of 
religious ideas, but we don’t take seriously enough the extraordinarily 
counterintuitive dimension of scientific thought—of rational thought.
EK: Precisely, seen in the context of these other modes, our familiar 
naturalism begins to look a bit strange.
PD: You know, Anthropology is such a difficult science because we’re 
never consistent. We’re humans, no? We constantly change positions. 
At the moment I’m a naturalist and yet I’m perfectly prepared to have 
empathy with my cat, even though I don’t have misgivings about eating 
meat, and this, despite the fact that I know quite well the deplorable 
conditions under which cattle are raised and slaughtered. So, I think that 
Achuar hunters also constantly shift between different ontologies. If we 
portray Amazonian people as animists or perspectivists, it’s because we 
choose to emphasize certain things that contrast the most vis-à-vis our 
own. We could treat them as ‘shopkeepers,’ and it would not be entirely 
false, either. In many instances we could ascribe their behavior to some 
form of personal maximization. Well, shopkeepers, no?
EK: Yes. Rational actors.
PD: Rational actors, maximizing their interests, and so on and so forth. 
This is why I’ve said that these ontologies are, for me, an experimental 
machine. Anthropology is an experimental machine in that respect also. 
We select the information we gather so as to highlight the differences. But 
we could also choose the reverse, although it would be less interesting, of 
course.
EK: Right. Your current project has an important ethical dimension. A 
certain kind of ethics grows out of a monistic Anthropology in which nature 
and society aren’t cut off from each other. What kind of environmentalism 
is possible when there’s no longer a nature to protect?
PD: Yes. The dissociation of nature from everything else has its consequences. 
The extraordinary greed with which modern societies (capitalist, as well as 
socialist, and post-socialist) have devoured natural resources is a byproduct 
of naturalism. And how you treat non-humans is a good indication of how 
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you’ll treat humans. So, in that respect, yes, any reform of the way we still 
exploit non-humans—as goods and resources—will be a good indicator 
of how much we’re willing to change relationships among humans. So, I 
think it’s a very general project; these things cannot be separated. People 
tend to say that we have to deal with human rights and freedoms before we 
can really start thinking about how we’re going to deal with non-humans, 
but I think the two are closely linked.
EK: The two are closely linked, especially if one takes seriously the idea 
that there are many kinds of subjects out there. How do we think about 
justice when our unit of analysis is no longer a human social entity but 
a “collective,” as you call it, that extends beyond species lines? It’s a real 
challenge to imagine an ethics that also extends to non-humans. As 
a consequence of your critique of naturalism, part of your approach to 
this involves a search for a way of limiting, as much as this is possible, 
our objectification of other kinds of subjects. Of course, since so much of 
interspecies relating revolves around killing, this is never fully attainable, 
nor, necessarily desirable.
PD: In a way, what I call relative universalism is also a form of ethics. There 
are some forms of relations that are acceptable, probably for everyone, and 
others that are unacceptable, also, probably, for everyone. And it’s not very 
far from an eco-centric ethics, such as the ones advocated by Aldo Leopold 
or J. Baird Callicot, for instance. The idea that the world, the biosphere, 
in a very direct sense of the term, and something even wider than that, is 
a huge combination of networks, of entities and that those entities with 
the greatest ability to perturb or disrupt the networks also have the most 
responsibility for trying to sustain it. And so, of course, this responsibility 
falls upon humans.  And I think that this is an idea that is also quite 
common—of course not in this specific form—in many animist societies.
EK: Yes.
PD: Yet, the problem is that… but this would require a long discussion 
(laughing), it’s also true that—well, the history of humanity just shows 
this—it’s very difficult to think through the consequences of your actions 
before the fact, even when, in some sense, you already know what the 
consequences will be. I remember talks I gave, years ago, to the leaders of 
the Shuar Federation, about cattle raising. I tried to convince them that 
although it provided short-term cash, it wasn’t a very good idea, ecologically 
or economically, for the long-term. They’d listen politely, but the day-to-
day pressure to make money and to secure land-rights led them to opt 
for cattle. It was very difficult.  I mean, it’s very hard to share your own 
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historical experience with people who have not had those experiences… 
It’s one of the disappointing things in life, you know, I mean, it just doesn’t 
work. You need to experience these things for yourself in order to change. 
You can’t just listen to advice if you haven’t experienced some of these 
things for yourself. And so it’s very frustrating trying to advise, or to be a 
compagnon de route, as we say in French, to the indigenous organizations 
because of that.
EK: Yes. This just reminds me, and maybe we should end on this note, of 
a conversation I had many years later with one of those Shuar Federation 
leaders you talked to. I was trying to explain to him Eduardo’s take on 
perspectivism. And he asked me a question that I wasn’t fully able to 
answer, which I think very much prefigures your critique of perspectivism.5 
When I presented to him the familiar perspectival image of a jaguar seeing 
the blood of his prey as manioc beer, he thought for a moment and then 
replied: “Yes, but when a white man drinks Coca-Cola what does he see 
it as?”
PD: (laughing) That’s very good!
EK: Which, actually, is exactly what you’re saying: Animism is pervasive—
what defines whiteness is a kind of body that would relate to Coca-Cola in 
the same way that a Shuar would related to manioc beer, or, for that matter, 
a jaguar to blood—and yet perspectivism isn’t fully reciprocal; it doesn’t 
work in every direction; and it doesn’t apply to all situations. Anyways, I 
thought that was a very profound—and animic—response from a Shuar 
man to this whole business.
PD: A very good answer, indeed. It is “l ’ethnographie sauvage” at its best 
(laughing).
NOTES
1. The anthropologist Anne-Christine Taylor, author of numerous important 
publications on the Achuar and other ethnological matters, currently directs 
research and teaching at the Musée de quai Branly in Paris and is also Research 
Director at CNRS.
2. To be published in English through The University of Chicago Press. An 
English language synthesis of the main arguments of the book also appears in 
Descola (2006).
3. See Latour (2009)
4. See especially Viveiros de Castro (1998).
5. See Descola (2005: 199-202)
15
A Conversation with Philippe Descola
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2009
150 Eduardo Kohn
REFERENCES CITED
Descola, Philippe
 1994  In the Society of Nature: A Native Ecology in Amazonia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
 1996  The Spears of Twilight: Life and Death in the Amazon Jungle. New 
York: The New Press.
 2005  Par-delà nature et culture. Paris: Gallimard.
 2006  “Beyond Nature and Culture.” Radcliffe-Brown Lecture in Social 
Anthropology, Proceedings of the British Academy 139:137-155.
Latour, Bruno
 1993  We Have Never Been Modern. C. Porter, translator. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press.
 2009  “Perspectivism: ‘Type’ or ‘bomb’?” Anthropology Today 25(2):1-2.
Serres, Michel
 2009  Écrivains, Savants et Philosophes Font le Tour du Monde. Paris: Le 
Pommier.  
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo
 1998  “Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism.” Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 4:469-488. 
16
Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol7/iss2/1
